University of Montana

ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and
Interviews

Mike Mansfield Papers

2-23-1968

University of Indiana Convocation - Assessment in Vietnam
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "University of Indiana Convocation - Assessment in Vietnam" (1968). Mike
Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews. 691.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/691

This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University
of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches, Statements and Interviews by an
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

-:MaTch 1, 1%8

8199~

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE

Senator made the fundamental point
thalrThcrc Is no ohllntlon to con tinue to pour
out the blood and resourc~s or this Nation
until South Vlctwun Is made safe for one
Vlctnamc~e faction or anothrr .

The Senator also cited the sad statistics when he made his speech a week
ago that reveal that thPre were 543 young
American mPn who had been killed in
the prrceding 7 days. That was the hi['hr:;t werkly lola\ of draths In the war. Today, only 1 1\'Cck Iuter, we find tha t \\'e
hnn• 1 e<tchcd the second highest total of
deaths of the war, 470 deaths have occurred. 'Hlis bri111~s us to a total of 18,709
young ntPll killed and 115,144 wounded
in this unhappy war-a total that Is not
far from the total young men ktlled and
wounded in the Korean conflict.
These mountin g casualty ftgures of
the United States alone-figures that do
not include the young Vietnamese men,
women, and children that have been and
are being killed in North and South
Vietnam-! believe show, stress, and underline the importance of the speech of
the Senator from Montana and make it
singularly significant today.
I call t he speech to the attention of
my colleagues and ask unarlimous consent that it be printed at this point in
the RECORD.
There being n o objection, the speech
was ordered to be printed in the RECORD,
as follows:
ASSESSMENr IN VIETNAM
(Remarks Of Senator MIK!: MANSFIELD, of

Montana, at the Indiana University Convocation, Eloomlngton, Ind., F e bruary 23 .
1968 )

THE DESIRABILITY OF A RESOLUTION OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN
VIETNAM
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, the problem
of Vietnam and what we should do in
achieving a decent resolution of our involvement in that wartorn, unhappy
land is a problem that looms over the
thinking, the plans, and the aspirations
of us all.
There is no Senator amongst us who
is more familiar and knowledgeable concerning this problem than is the senior
Senator from Montana (Mr. MANSFIELD] ,
whose knowledge of the area and whose
experience with its people is great.
The distinguished Senator from Montana made a singularly perceptive and
forthright speech at the convocation of
the University of Ind iana a week ago today. In the course •f that speech, the

The struggle In Vietnam hM turned grim,
pitiless, and devastating. The casualty llguree are stagge11ng. The physical damage 1s
enormous. Men, women, children, solcUers,
guerrillas. weapons. mac.hlnes. cities, towns,
and v11lages-all are thrown together in an
inferno of destruction.
'
·
I t Ls not surprising that the situation has
been interpreted in some quarters as ap•
proaching some sort or cllmax. It may well
be, as has been suggested . the beginning of
the end. The question Is what beginning and
what end? Peace by millta.ry v1ctory? Peace
by negotiations? With whom? For what?
There Ls no certainty at thLs point as to what
wUJ emerge In Vietnam, or for that matter,
whether the end of thls war Is to be found in
Vietnam.
I have no desir e. therefore. to indulge, today, ln what has beco me a kind or pa.rlor
game called "Who's wlnnln.g in Vietnam?" It
is offensive to me. as I know i t must be to
you. to hear thls deadly conflict treated as
some sort of athletic contest. The lives of too
many young Americans are on the line in
VIetnam. T oo many bewlldered men and
women and children are being burnt.
bloodied and broken by tills war . Too much Is
in ruins. Too many lle dead. Vl~tn am Ls not
a game. There can be no winners; there are
onl y losers and the longer the war perslsls
the greater n.re the losses f or all concerned.
The tragedy or Vietnam constrains us all to
great sobriety In discussion. There Ls llttle
polnt In speculating on the current ciMhes-who ls winning and who Is not or what Ls
belng won a nd what Is n o t . The need ls to
try to define o.ccurately the chnr11cter of the
present tr agedy and, ln that way, hopefully,
to see m ore clea.rly what the interests of this
n ation will require in the days ahead.
In tills respect, seldom has a problem presented greater dlmcultles than Vietnam and
seldom has the need for a solution been
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!'renter A rest.orat!on or p!•ac•• !A lmpernll e
for ~he WPlfare of the people Of Vle~nnm:
they have been rough~ over for •o long that.
in the nulllons. they are torn from their
nncestral places see:kmg refuge where there
!s no refuge For us. too, an honor.tble solu'1 ·n Is of the utmost urgency. The war in
•·1~ nom has been deeply divisive In it.< efcts on this nation It hns cHverted energy
r 1d r csources !rom the f."!' en t needs of our
< wn society. The vast cllfficult!es or the urban
rea.,, for exnmple, cry out !or att-ention,
bu~ the cry Is barely heard above the din
of the dl•t:'lnt conft!ct.
Tht nation's economic equ!l!br!um Is In
d:mger or b('!ng thrown out or k!lter by the
Immense demands of the war I n thl$ connect.ton. we have already suffered a s!gnlflca.nt degree or lnllat!on. Furthennore, we
are confronted with what can onlv be c:\llcd
the embarrassment of having to ·cllscour:\ge
the travel of Americans abroad, beC:\USe or
d!f!\cult!cs which the war and other foreign
commitments h:wc Introduced Into the nation's balance of payments,
In our relations with the rest or the world,
the war In V!etnnm hrl..< pla.ced formidable
blocks in the way or further progress In International cooperation. It has brought In
Its wake new threats to the st..~b!J!ty of peace,
as In the case of U1e U S.S. Pueblo Incident
which may be but the precu!'llor or others
In these pinpoints or !n.<tab111ty, moreover,
there are ever-present threats to the !nul
defensfl6 o! the world ll!(alrl.llt nuclear catastrophe.
We did not arrive at this sltu.ltlon overnight. Our Involvement in VIetnam Is not
new born. If we are at n cr068J'oa.ds, today,
It ls but one In a chain o! cro"SJ'oads which
extends backwards for many years. There
comes to mind. !or exnmple, the mome•lt o!
the French collap<e and the Geneva C<>n!erences of 1954: the oss38Sinatton or PresIdent Ngo D!nh Diem In 1963 and the rl'pla.c-em-ent of civilian government In Saigon
by a series of unstable reglmee, drawn ever
more steadily from mlll ta.ry sou ret'S, ever
more dependent on the United StatPs.
Finally, there comee to mind the Tonkin BRy
Incident and the lame-fiCII.Je direct military
englll(emcnt of the United States theren!ter
In the war In Vietnam.
In retrol!peot It is app..,...nt that at oor.h or
th..,;e C1'06Sroads the AmPrlcn.n military Involvement has deepened . It Is aleo apparpnt
tha.t the BU<X'esslve !ncren.see In millta.ry
commitment havE' led , so far. not to peac(',
but rsther to a.n lncroo.'l(' In <">Unkr mil!tnry
commitment. At the end of 1965, five SenRtors Including myself visited V!etnnm In a
report made public at the oon<'lusion or our
study. we stntl'd that we had found that
this naUon's m111tnry ell'ort wM " ... pressing
ngalnst a mll!ta.ry s!tua.tlon which Is, In ell'ect,
open ended How open is d('pend<'nt on the
extent to which North Vletnnm and its supporters nre willing and able to m('('t tncreMed
force by lncreMed !o~."
H<"w open the war? How able anrl wtll!ng
the oppo. !ng fore"<! to moot !ncrensro forc·e
hy !ncret1S('(! force•
Our armed forces In V!etnnm have !ncren~ed from 23.000 at the beginning o~ 1065
to more than half a mlll!on today The l>omb!ng of North V!,.tnam by air and rea has
l!'r<>Wn from spoctllc retal!at!on for spcctflc
VIet Cong n<'ts of olf<'nsc agatn.•t our forces
into the m 011t systPmnt!c air nnd nnval bombardment since World Wfl.r II. The ton11nge
of expl08h·es which has fallPn upon VIetnam
Is alr!'ndy higher than In Kore:•. or, !or that
m:Lt!Rr, In the entire Pactflc Theatre during
World War II nnd probaUly clo.qe to tha~
unl""'*'<! In Europe. Moreover, one by one,
the l!m!taUons on bomb!ng-t'l.rg;:-1:4! In North
V!ctnnm have been removed until a nwr"
handful Is all that now stands a!(alnst !udlscrlm!na.te destntct!on o! life and property.
Indeed, the search for an elusive victory hn.s
led some to clamor for that Indiscriminate
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even t•) the point of ret tm!ng
Vlettnm to the St.one Age
Wtth l'SC~lat!on has camp m ounting looses
of life on all sides. U.S. c ISualty lists are
.llready longer In the first 1\\'l' or six wt>t"ks of
1968 than they werl' durin,: the ent.lrc year
of 1965. In all o! 11165, 1 36!1 Americans W<'re
killed By Februilry 10. ~h1s year. 1.674 Amer1''1-lls h.td alrea<ly been killed. AccordiJg to
I'<'P<)rt.< IRSuNI 111 S.tlgon on yesterdn". 543
ntldll!omll Amer tc.1ns were kllled In the Inst
seven d ys, the highest weekly total o! thl'
vdr. Tlw o\'er-all flgmcs now st:tnd at 18,:!39
dl'ath" and t.he woumh'<l toW 112.469 Among
Utt• nppo61ng forces, of coul$e, tilcre are reP >rts of astrottmical Increases In mo:n killed,
taken pr!sonN, or dcs~rt.tng.
I cite thl'.>e gruesn:uc flgur<'., to Indicate
the !rnm en.<.e gmwW1 In the S<'Ope of ~hi' conflict, J>.trt!culnrly as !t. ha., Involved the Uu!tc<l
Stat s I find 11 mo~t lnappr..pr!nte tha.t this
effort .• nd the:.c grf''lt K'l<'rltlccs are, tn effect.
called !nn.ctequate In 11onw qu 1rtcrs. The fact
Is th t. short of what Prim~ M!ntster W!lson
has called the "lunacy" of nuclear war, this
nation hIS llll\de a mu."-1!1<•' military •ll'ort ln
V!etnnm The effort lla.' l><'<'n mo.de by dedicated A.tuerlcarL,, ably led, who h~ve carried
out their ord<>rs with couragf' and skill. At
this lnte date, It ought at least to be clellr
that If the s!tunt!on In Vtctnrun has not
changed as anticipated, It hilS not been for
want or an extraordinary mll!t.ary effort by
thl" United St-ates AntPrlc:tn forces may well
have done too much but by no stretch of
t.be In g!nat!vn C:\n It be s.'\.ld that thPy h11ve
done to little
Ne,ertheless. the reality Is that the situation lu.s not chnn~ !<! as .tnt!c!p:lted. At the
t.1mc or my last ' sit to V!etnnm In 1965.
a\all ble estimates .ntllcated that 22 percent
of the population or South VIetnam hns
under control of the N1Uon:.I Liberation
Frmt, GO percent under governm('nt <:o::Jtrol
and 18 percent cont ted At the end or l~•t
yea.r, th~ Saigon go,·crnment wa.~ reported AS
controlling 67 p<'rcPnL or the population, presum bly a gain o! 7 percent. Sul><;t·tnt!al progresa wn.s also reported In the so-called
pact!lc,,tton
progrnm which had bPt>n
des gned to strengthNl and expand S.'\.lgon·s
con t.rol over the rur~oll nre.'\8.
Tlwn came the wave or attacks ag.dnst
the cities or South \ tetnam One con put
whate\('r 1lterpreta.t!on one choo•es on th~se
recent clashes. \\'hate\ er els(' they may mean,
thry bring Into question the validity of the
m('a~ un-s of military progreSt; which have
bePn used In ~a!gon Tl1ey bring mto question the effectiveness or the Saigon political
~·ructure, In Its pre ent lt.rm. 'I11ey bring
Into qu!!6tlon the pnc!!lcntton program
w hlch nppenrs w ha"' gone the route or at
le st a dozen prior con tr!ved techniques for
''winning the people" or VIetnam Tlwy mnke
clear, finally, that the cities of South V!etn :un which have heretofore been spared,
almost by tacit agreemt>nt, have now bllf'n
drawn fully Into the vortex of the war's terrible dC\'URtatlon.
Whatever the outcome of the prc•ent battles, the baste military problem Is a• It hns
be<'n from the outset The war remains openended and escnlatron con t!nues to rise wl th
CS('alat!on, The National Liberation Front
rl'mnlus onm!prc•sPnt, from the dem!l!tarlzed
zonp ut'the l?Lh paral l!•l to the southern tip
of the penhl uln It.~ r('gular forces and guerr!lln are obv!ouslv ~tcel<•cl to accept great
pr! vH t!on and to mn ke enormous sacr!flc!·s.
The \'let Cong renmin entrenched and virtually untouched In their traditional strongholds--the swamps. pacldyfields and hamlets
or the Mekong Delta from whence they arc
"blc to dispatch f or'rs to r!'!n!orce units
which, IU! Is nov; npparent. honeycomb
Sn!gon und other c!t.!es.
It Is drme:erous to pn'sume thn: ('ither the
forcl'fl of the JS'at!onal Liberation Front or
North VIetnam nrc uear!ng the end or the
rop<'. Actually, Hanoi has committed to the
dPstru~tion,

J!fcu-r·h 1, 1968

war in the South co ns rdprabl\ less than a
q uarter of th e for ces o f G eneral Vo Nguyen
Glap who rs genernlly credited with mastermlndtng t ile cu rreHt mil!t.ary strategy In the
South And beyond North VIetna m lies the
untapped manpower of China and the supply
sourcPs of both China and the Sovret Union.
These nre some o r the re ~ II t ies which a re
not measured by the com p uters of "progress"
In Saigon. These are some or the realities
which seem to me to mnke It Imperative to
recall the or!g! na I purposes of the American
commitment to South V!etaam . They were,
~bovc ali • Isc. limlt·•d purposl's. There Is not
now nnct there hru- never beE-n n mn.nd~t.e t.o
take over a war. The commtwncnt Is to support not to supplant
At the outse~. It was not an American responsibility and It Is not now an American
responsibility to win a victory for any p nrt!cular group or VIetnamese or to defeat any
particular group of VIetnamese. Even If we
could, It Is n ot In the Interest.< of this nation
to synthesize a pol!tlcaJ structure !or South
VIetnam . That Is not and ought not ever
to become the !unction of the American
m111tary command, the American economists.
administrators, diplomats, political scientists. aid-officials, and others who are
gathered In VIetnam. The sooner that the
!un i ts of our commitment are understood by
nil d!rE'Ctly co ncerned the better for all concrrned
It Is time to recognize thnt our Immense
ell'ort has already gone a long way to alter
the character of what was once an Inner
struggle among VIetnamese. It ts also time
to recognize that wh:.tever we may do, the
future or VIetnam d e pends not on us but on
the VIetnamese themselves. It Is their country; they live In !t. They will be living In It
long after we are gone from !t.
Our res pons!b111ty ls to sustain, not to submerge To strip the VIetnamese struggle o!
its VIetnamese character, to convert It Into
a war to be won or lost by this nation, ls to
detract from Its r('levance both to the people
or VIetnam nncl to the people or the United
States. To do so Is to consol!date a.n American invo lvement on the Southeast Asian
mainland of Indefinite duration and obscure
purp<Y"es whose terminus Is not vl~!ble--not
In VIetnam, not In lAos, or In Cambodia. Indeed. It may well be an Involvement which
Is without exit except In World War III.
Thls nation ls dee ply committed In South
VIetnam but let us not m a ke the mistake
of Interpreting that commitment as compell!ng us-In the name o f victory or whatever-to see to It that every last member
of the NLF Is either dulled, dead, captive. o r
In !light That course lends not to an ending
but to an endless succession o! violent beginnings.
An Inextricable Involvement of American
forces In VIetnam may meet the needs of
some but It acrords nei t her with the Interest.• of the United Stntes or the people
of V!etnum In thts connection. President
Johnson has repeatedly r.ta.ted that thls n ation's objective ts " . . . only that the people of South VIetnam be allowed to guide
their own country In their own way." He
has st..~ted that he ls w1lllng to move at any
time In negotiations wWch might bring
about that re>!mlt. He h ns stated that we are
prepared to move out lock. stock, and barrel
In a m atter o! mont.hs after a satisfactory
settlement Is uch!cv Pd .
lL should be clear, therefore, to all concerned Americans and VIetnamese In WashIngton. In Saigon, and In Hanoi and to
whomever, wherever- that that Is the accurate measure of this nation's comm!tmeut.
There Is no obl!gat!on to con t!nue to pour out
the blood and resources o! this nation until
South VIetnam Is made safe for one V!etn'lmese faction or another. On the contrar y, t here Is an obl!gatlon to the people
of the United States to conserve th at blOOd
and those resources and, to the people or
V!ctnnm, there Is an obllga tlon to a\'Oid the
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dcdructlon or their Ia nd

~nd

society even

In U1c nnn1c o! saving t.hcnt

Indeed, ln my judgment, there Is now
JltUe prospect of meeting Lhese deep obligations to the people or this nation and to Lhe
people or VIetnam unless there Is a prompt
ces.;atlon or the bloodletting and the negoll:ttlon of nn honorable settlement. For that
ron,on, every possibility of peace must continue to be explored fully ancl with the uturgency.
Tile North VIetnamese have stated that

nl o~t..
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for d('l.('rtnlning, In pC'n«.c. t.IH' future rcJ:.t-

tlonshlp of the two parts ot VIetnam and
for r.unrantcclng the urulrnllznt Ion of Vietnam and of Incloch lnn. 1\ rcnctlvnt.lon of the
Geneva. Conff'rcnc£', the refore, by the co-

chairmen t.hc United Ki n gdom and the Soviet Union-Is clearly desirable Geneva,
howcvf'r, is not ncccssarlly the only beacon

of peace and. In any c\ent. It has yet to
be lit. If the Secretary-General of the United
Na.Uons, a group of Asian nations, European
nations, African nations, Communist nations or any combination t.hPrcor were
prepnr<'d and able. to convene a peace conference, those approaches, too, arc obviously
wor thy or every consideration.

t!1ey w111 open negotiations If the bombing
of the North Is discontinued. I n that connection, It shou ld be noted, first, that the
bombing has not achieved the purposes ror
The Senate voted a rcsol u tion on Novcn1which It was sanctioned. The bom bing has
not stopped the movement of men and sup- ber 30th last, urging that VIetnam be
plies Into the South; on the contrary, the brought a.ctlvely before the Security Council
rou tcs of Inti! tra tlon carr y a heavier traffic of the United Na lions. The proposnl wus
than ever before and tbe traffic Includes ever for a dlre<\t approach to the problem by
more sophisticated weapons. The bombing means or tbe open processes or the u .N.
Charter.
lUIS done little, If anything, for the mor ale
At the very least, an lnltlaUve In the U.N.
or the people of South Vlctnnm and such In dications as tbere are, suggest that It has Secarlty Council would help to clarify the
done a great den! to strengthen the determi- significance or the words of p.,.a<:e whlch are
nation or the people ot North VIetnam. ralsed on all sides. At the very least, 1t
Finally, the bombing has not yet brought could help to emphasize thls 1at1on's readl Hanoi to the conference table, as a suspen- ness to take Its chances on a 1 eaceful settlesion, now. probably will. In short, the bomb- ment o r the conflict In ac• ord wltb t h e
Ing of the North has added a vast dtmenslo n world-8.'\llCtlOned premises or the Charter.
In my judgment, we should and can make
to the war. It has ratsed the cost or the war
ln lives and resources--American and other- clear, by procedural vote, that we are willing
but It has not brought closer-so far as can to submit this question of Vletnnm to the
Security Counctl. We should and can make
be seen-an honorable end to the conflict.
It 1s In this context that I have endorsed clear, by procedural vote, that we are prea proposal to confine tbe bombi n g to t he pared to Invite any nation or group whi ch
tnl!Jtratlon routes at the 17th parallel. I t Is of relevance to a settlement. Inc! udlng
may be tnat ln this p roposal, which was ad- Hanoi and tbe NLF and Chtna, to participate
vanced lnltlally by Senator Cooper o! Ken- In a race-to-face dlscusslon of the war. We
tucky----a former Ambassador to India-may should and can make clear, by procedural
be found a first step to peace. I am frank to vote, that If the emotions klndled by the constate, however, that whlle tbere Is r eason to filet render undesirable a meeting or t h e
expect an opening or n egotiations I! tbe Security Council In New York, we are prebombing or the North Is curbed, It Is not at pared to see the Council meet In Geneva or
all certain that negotiations, In turn, wlll anywhere else, as provided for by the Charbring the conflict to an honor able conclusion. ter. In short, we should and can make
Negotiations may be futile; they may fall. In clear, by votes, that we are willing to follow
the end, they may prove no more effective, the U.N. path to poace.
It would seem that nmong the 15 member
than mllltary escalation has proved to be, In
nations o! the Security Cou n cil, there ought
brlnglng this war to an acceptable end.
Indeed, tt Is not ltkely that negotiation• to be found at least the required nine votes
Will be fruitful at this time I! the conflict to respond to an Initiative o! the United
Is defined as a stmple, clear-cut case or ag- States, calling !or a U.N. effort to open the
gression on the part or the North against door to a settlement In VIetnam .
Nevertheless, It ouch Is not the case, 1t
the South or as some sort o! final test whi ch
has pitted the forces o! freedom In Vietnam seems desirabl e to know now. by formal a 1d
open
test, win or Jose, who Is willing and " 10
In a showdown against Communism. The
reality In Vietnam Is far more complex, both Is unwilling to confront the Issue o! peace In
In the relatlonshlps which exist between Vietnam before the bar or the world. May I
North and South Vietn am and among the say that It does no service to the Un ited Na tions to shrink ! r om brin gin g befor e It a
vari ous groups and elemen ts w it hin South
Vietnam. How complex , for example, Is In- situation which Involves Its f undam ental
eason for being.
r
dicated by the composition or the present
On thls point, I would note, too, that the
government In Saigon. It ts based almost en tirely upon a military faction and most or members o! the U.N. ought not to overlook
Its principals are not Southern VIetnamese the obligations or the organization In conbut Northern VIetnamese. They are clearly nection wl th the rising tensions In Kor en.
not the whole coin or poli tical leadership The U.N. has been Involved- deeply InIn South VIetnam. There are other sources volved- for two decades In Koren. I t was with
o! Indigenous leadership, other groups which the sanction of the U.N. that this nation carare without significant voice In the present ried the main burden or the war which was
fought In Korea. It was with U .N. guidance
Southern political structure.
that the truce In Korea was achieved. It Is
It would be an advance towards peace, In stlJJ within the competence or the U.N. to
my judgment, I! the door to reconciliation de'!! with the unresol ved questions of Korea,
could be opened among South Vietnamese of and, In particular, when they pose threats
all political Inclinations. It that Is not to or renewed war.
be, however, I cannot see that the diplomacy
Insofar as this nation's unilateral responslor this nation must remain hog-tied by the blll ties respecting Korea a re concerned, the
Inflexibility or others. The responsibilities firm restraint which President Johnson hao
which are owed to the people o! this nation exercised from the outset In the Pueblo afand VIetnam urge the seeking o! an honor- fair, In my judgment, has set a wise course.
able peace, wherever and however It may The question Is being pursued quietly at the
be found and regardless o! who may be Panmunjom truce site In discussions between
willing to join In the search.
or representatives and those of North Korea
It Is possible that tbe divergent fears and Third-party channels are also being explorert:
interests which are lnvol\ed--<llrectly and In short, the effort at this time Is to seek
indirectly- In the VIetnamese conflict may by diplomacy tho r elease of the crewmen
still be reconcilable on the basis o! the allve-I repeat, alive. It Is a prudent course
Geneva Accords o! 1954 and 1962. These ln what Is, at best, a delicate and danger ous
agreements mlght still provide a framework situation and It deserve; every support.

Tulks ut P.uununjon nnd t.hc ~cnrd1 for
t.hlr<l party 1nt' rce8ston, however. do uot
hPVin tn rxh:-tii!-·L the posslhlllli,..s of solution.
lf LhC'~f' clfol t.~; cln not. he~r f ruit, othrr op~

t.ions mlty nlao be a vntlabl('. T h e P rrsld cn t

h.as alrcacty had the matter raised at t.he U .N.
SeC"urlty Council l>y Anlb:t<sador Ql)lf.JIJ' r;.;. If
rl:"cces:uy. it ran f 1 nd should hr p:-Pf..~Pd nnr·w

In that forum It may be fca.,lt>lr. thrrcby,
to r:c:-•k nn 1mp:tr~~a1 intc.' tlgatlon. arl' : r:ltion
or n1edlntlon of the dispute or n pr cseut.:llion
of the entire m '1tt.C' r to t 1, ... \VcrJd C'ourt
\Vhatever the spectllc r ecours<'. ill n1v

judgment, the effor ts to fi n d a peaceful •ettlement of the P ueblo alTair nr e att u n ed to
this nation's Interest. W hat m atters, fi rst, Is
t.he safe release of the crewm en. Wh nt m:\ttcrs m ost Is the substan ce n ot t h e sh ad ow
of this nation's Interests.
The flare-up In K orea, coming on top o!
Vl<'tnarn. lndlc·>tcs the hydra-headed potential of war on the Asian continen t. The
new and dangero11s confrontation In the
forme r suggests t he urgen cy or en d ing the
conlllct on an hon orable ba.~ls In the latter.
I do not know what the n rospect !or peace
may be by way of t h e U.N. RJ>proach wh ich
has been suggested. ObvlouBly, a U .N. approach cannot be a n y less effective t han t h e
countless other a pproach es whtch h ave al ready been att empt ed w it h out success . On
the other hand, i t m ay not be any m ore
effective.
I n any event, somewhere, som ehow , there
must be the beginnings of a n ego t iated settlemen t. Until It Is found, the fires of conflic t
will bla7e ever m ore fiercely In VIetnam ;
the arc o! war's wreck age Will continue to
open o n the con tinent or Asia . And I! t he
fires burn out o r con t rol to World War III,
what nation will then claim the victory ?
Indeed, what nation will be left to claim It?

